The linear equilibrium of Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) is the only equilibrium of their model. Without incentive uncertainty, earnings management models admit a continuum of nonlinear separating and partially pooling equilibria; any amount of normally distributed incentive uncertainty, however small, eliminates them. The main theorem is verified in Lean.

Focused survey of theoretical and empirical work on firm disclosure and the cost of capital, alongside an illustrative model. Discusses lingering issues in the literature, including unresolved puzzles.

Studies how trading, stock returns, and borrow fees in the securities lending market evolve around public announcements, such as earnings. These patterns hinge on, and can be used to infer, the extent to which investors disagree about firm value vs. the announcement.

Models how the corporate alternative minimum tax affects real and accruals-based earnings management. Studies the implications for earnings' informativeness, how investors respond to earnings, and which firms pay more in the tax.

Climate risk disclosure renders financial markets more effective at enabling climate risk sharing, but firms' voluntary climate risk disclosures can be enough for efficient risk sharing. The impact of climate disclosure on firms' expected returns depends on the climate preferences of the firm's investor base.

Retail investors buy call options prior to the earnings announcements that generate the most risk to market makers, causing the prices of these options to soar and depleting these traders' wealth.

Earnings' usefulness in valuation depends on their "horizon," or how long it would have taken the information they contain to arrive via other sources; this can be estimated using patterns in return volatility over firms' reporting cycles.

Accounting for investor private information and liquidity trade, belief dispersion and distress risk have opposite effects on expected equity and debt returns.

When prices reflect both cash-flow and discount-rate news, how does feedback affect investment, firm value, and welfare?

Introduces voluntary disclosure a la Dye and Verrecchia to the classic Grossman-Stiglitz-Hellwig model of trade, and studies liquidity, mandatory disclosure, and returns.

When complexity in disclosure can be used to obfuscate bad news, but is also necessary to fully convey information, in equilibrium, both firms with highly positive and negative news issue complex disclosures.

Because conservative accounting delays the recognition of highly positive news, it leaves open the possibility of a future spike in price. This presents a downside risk to short sellers, which causes noise trade to raise firms' valuations.

Conservatism vs. aggressiveness in earnings determines the skewness of returns around their release, which can be measured using the relative prices of in-the-money and out-of-the-money options.

Risk information raises sophisticated investors' ability to profit from private information and managers' ability to learn from stock prices.

Changes in the implied volatilities of options with different maturity dates can be used to measure the information in earnings on firm risk. Empirically, earnings appear to significantly revise investors' beliefs about risk.

Earnings' use in learning about risk causes ERCs to vary over the business cycle, generates return autocorrelation, and leads to asymmetric reactions to positive vs. negative earnings surprises.

In a cheap-talk setting with multiple receivers, additional senders facilitate communication because the receivers can match with senders who have similar biases.

Jointly modeling investors' private information on firms' expected cash flows and risk can reconcile empirical patterns in derivative pricing and trade.

Information on overall firm risk lowers firms' costs of capital; firms have greater incentives to provide such information following spikes in risk.

Uncertainty over firms' systematic risk-factor exposures generates skewness in payoffs, which investors like. As a result, disclosure about these exposures can raise firms' costs of capital.